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Abstract. Following an idea due to Thomson (Journal of Economic Theory,
1981, 25: 431–441) we examine the role of reference functions in the axiomatic
approach to the solution of bargaining problems with and without claims. A
reference function is a means of summarizing essential features of a bar-
gaining problem. Axioms like Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and
Monotonicity are then reformulated with respect to this reference function.
Under some weak conditions on the reference function we obtain charac-
terizations of diﬀerent parametrized classes of solutions. We present several
examples of reference functions and thereby recover many well-known
solutions to bargaining problems with and without claims.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide a unifying approach to the solution of
bargaining problems with and without claims. To this end we study the role
of reference functions in the deﬁnition and axiomatization of bargaining
solutions. Reference points like the status quo and the ideal point have ever
played an important role in characterizations of bargaining solutions but the
ﬁrst formal introduction of the concept of a reference function in the context
of two-person bargaining problems is due to Thomson [12]. A reference point
represents an origin from which relative utility gains or losses can be
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measured and it is meant to summarize features of the bargaining problem
that are regarded as essential, either by the players or by some impartial
arbitrator.
In this paper we examine reference functions mainly in the context of n-
person bargaining problems with claims. Solutions to this class of problems
also utilize reference points like the status quo and the claims point. And, as
in the case of traditional bargaining problems, we might wish to use more
general reference points that, for example, take into account some properties
of the feasible set. Thus, like Thomson [12], we consider very general refer-
ence functions and show how solutions to bargaining problems with claims
can be classiﬁed apart from diﬀerences in the reference function. By formu-
lating axioms like Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Monotonicity
with respect to the given reference function g we obtain characterizations of
three diﬀerent classes of solutions, all parametrized by g: Nash-, egalitarian-
and proportional-type solutions. In this way we can point out the common
features between several solutions that have been analyzed independently of
each other so far.
Although our focus is on bargaining problems with claims, as a corollary
we obtain characterization results for solutions to bargaining problems
without claims. We present several examples of reference functions that fulﬁll
the conditions needed for the characterization results, but do not argue in
favor of a particular function which would clearly go beyond the scope of this
paper. For particular choices of the reference function we do not only recover
well-known bargaining solutions including the Nash, egalitarian, Kalai-
Smorodinsky, equal-loss, proportional and claim-egalitarian solution, but we
also ﬁnd interesting new solution concepts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the basic deﬁnitions.
In Sects. 3, 4, and 5 we present the characterization results for egalitarian-,
Nash- and proportional-type solutions, respectively. Section 6 concludes the
paper with some ﬁnal remarks.
2 Notation and deﬁnitions
In the following, N will denote the set of positive integers and R will denote
the set of real numbers. By Rn; n 2 N; we denote the n-dimensional euclidean
space. Vector inequalities in Rn are denoted by ; >;.1 By Rnþ and Rnþþ we
denote the set of nonnegative and strictly positive vectors in Rn, respectively,
i.e. Rnþ ¼ x 2 Rnjx  0f g and Rnþþ ¼ x 2 Rnjx 0f g. Weak set inclusion is
denoted by . Convergence of a sequence of subsets of Rn is deﬁned in terms
of the Hausdorﬀ topology. By x  y we denote the scalar product of x and y in
1For x; y 2 Rn we write x  y if xi  yi for all i, x > y if x  y and x 6¼ y, and x y if
xi > yi for all i.
528 A. Gerber
Rn. A set A  Rn is called comprehensive if x 2 A and x > y imply that y 2 A.
For A  Rn let
WPO ðAÞ ¼ x 2 Ajy 2 Rn; y  x) y =2Af g
be the set of weakly Pareto optimal points in A and let
PO ðAÞ ¼ x 2 Ajy 2 Rn; y > x) y =2Af g
denote the set of Pareto optimal points in A.
The set N ¼ f1; . . . ; ng; n 2 N; will denote the player set. If p : N ! N is a
permutation, then p deﬁnes the mapping p : Rn ! Rn, which we denote by the
same symbol, via ðpðxÞÞi ¼ xp1ðiÞ; i 2 N ; x 2 Rn. For a set A  Rn let
pðAÞ ¼ fy j 9x 2 A with y ¼ pðxÞg. We call A  Rn symmetric if pðAÞ ¼ A for
all permutations p. A mapping L : Rn ! Rn is called a positive aﬃne trans-
formation if there exist a 2 Rnþþ and b 2 Rn such that for all x 2 Rn and all
i; LðxÞð Þi¼ aixi þ bi. Let L be the class of all positive aﬃne transformations
on Rn. For a set A  Rn and L 2L let LðAÞ ¼ fy j 9x 2 A with y ¼ LðxÞg.
Bargaining problems were ﬁrst studied by Nash [9] and are deﬁned as
follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1. An n-person bargaining problem is a tuple ðS; dÞ; where
1. S  Rn is convex, closed and comprehensive,
2. d 2 S;
3. fx 2 S j x  dg is bounded.
A bargaining problem is characterized by a set S of feasible utility allo-
cations, measured in von Neumann-Morgenstern scales, and a point d, called
‘‘threatpoint’’ or ‘‘disagreement point’’ or ‘‘status quo,’’ which is the outcome
of the game if the players do not agree on a utility allocation in the feasible
set. Thus, the status quo d can be unilaterally enforced by any player. Let R
be the class of all n-person bargaining problems. A solution on a class of
bargaining problems D  R is a mapping f : D! Rn such that f ðS; dÞ 2 S
for all ðS; dÞ 2 D.
Consider now a bargaining situation in which the players have claims that
are not compatible with each other. Assume that the claims are credible or
veriﬁable and that all players agree that they should be taken into account by
any (fair) solution to the problem at issue. The classic example for such a
situation is a bankruptcy problem. While in the latter utility is transferable,
general bargaining problems with claims, including those with nontransfer-
able utility, were introduced by Chun and Thomson [3].
Deﬁnition 2.2. An n-person bargaining problem with claims is a triple ðS; d; cÞ;
where
1. ðS; dÞ 2 R;
2. c 2 Rn n S; c > d:
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Let Rc be the class of all n-person bargaining problems with claims. A
solution on a class of bargaining problems with claims Dc  Rc is a mapping
F : Dc ! Rn such that F ðS; d; cÞ 2 S for all ðS; d; cÞ 2 Dc. In the following
sections we will study solutions for bargaining problems with and without
claims.
3 Egalitarian-type solutions
Consider a reference function given by a mapping g : Rc ! Rn. As explained
in the introduction a reference function is a means of summarizing ‘‘essential’’
features of a bargaining problem and a reference point will serve as an origin
from which relative utility gains or losses are measured. Observe that we do
not necessarily require the reference point to be a feasible utility allocation.
Let e ¼ ð1; . . . ; 1Þ 2 Rn and deﬁne the diagonal D in Rn by
D ¼ fxjx ¼ k e forsome k 2 Rg. We impose the following assumptions on the
reference function g : Rc ! Rn.
(E1) Covariance with respect to translations. Let ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc and let L 2L
be a translation, i.e. there exists b 2 Rn such that for all x 2 Rn and for
all i, LðxÞð Þi¼ xi þ bi. Then gðLðS; d; cÞÞ ¼ LðgðS; d; cÞÞ.2
(E2) Invariance with respect to the restriction to a symmetric subset. Let
ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc be such that gðS; d; cÞ 2 D. Then there exists
S0; d 0; c0ð Þ 2 Rc such that S0  S, S0 is symmetric, S0 \ D ¼ S \ D, and
g S0; d 0; c0ð Þ ¼ gðS; d; cÞ.
(E3) Invariance with respect to approximation. Let ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc with
gðS; d; cÞ 2 D. Then there exists a sequence Sn; dn; cnð Þð Þn Rc such that
Sn ! S, S  Sn; WPO Snð Þ \ D ¼ PO Snð Þ \ D; and g Sn; dn; cnð Þ ¼
gðS; d; cÞ for all n.
E1 is a weakening of the standard covariance with respect to positive aﬃne
transformations axiom. In a context, where utility is measured in von Neu-
mann-Morgenstern utility scales and where there is interpersonal comparison
of utility, we consider two bargaining problems as equivalent if one is ob-
tained from the other by a shift in each player’s origin of utility measurement.
Thus, we would like the reference function to comply with such shifts, i.e., be
covariant under translations. E2 and E3 are minimal technical requirements
we have to impose on the reference function in order to obtain our charac-
terization result below. It is understood that a reference function not satis-
fying these axioms can nevertheless be reasonable. Observe that we are not
concerned with justifying or characterizing reference functions, which we take
as exogenously given, but rather we aim at characterizing bargaining solu-
tions that fulﬁll some properties with respect to a given reference function.3
2Any L 2L induces the mapping L : Rc ! Rc, denoted by the same symbol, via
LðS; d; cÞ ¼ LðSÞ; LðdÞ; LðcÞð Þ for all ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc.
3For further discussion we refer the reader to our concluding remarks in Sect. 6.
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Hence the axioms we impose upon the reference function are qualitatively
diﬀerent from the axioms we ask to be satisﬁed by a bargaining solution. All
we have to make sure is that our axioms are satisﬁed by the common refer-
ence functions that have emerged in the literature, so that our characteriza-
tion is not void. We will see later that this is indeed the case for the axioms we
impose.
Consider the following axioms for a solution F : Dc ! Rn on a class
Dc  Rc.
(WPO) Weak Pareto optimality. F ðS; d; cÞ 2WPO ðSÞ for all ðS; d; cÞ 2 Dc.
(SYg) Symmetry with respect to g. If ðS; d; cÞ 2 Dc is such that S is symmetric
and gðS; d; cÞ 2 D, then F ðS; d; cÞ 2 D.
(TRANS) Covariance with respect to translations. For all ðS; d; cÞ 2 Dc, if
L 2L is a translation and if LðS; d; cÞ 2 Dc, then F ðLðS; d; cÞÞ ¼
LðF ðS; d; cÞÞ.
(RMONg) Restricted monotonicity with respect to g. Let ðS; d; cÞ;
S0; d 0; c0ð Þ 2 Dc with g S0; d 0; c0ð Þ ¼ gðS; d; cÞ and S  S0. Then F ðS; d; cÞ 
F S0; d 0; c0ð Þ.
WPO is a standard axiom in bargaining theory and is certainly a minimal
requirement for any reasonable solution. SYg is the symmetry axiom (cf.
Nash [9]) with the reference point substituted for the disagreement point. For
an interpretation of TRANS, see our remarks about E1. Finally, RMONg is
Kalai’s [7] monotonicity axiom with the reference point substituted for the
disagreement point. Consider the following solution on the class Rc.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Let g : Rc ! Rn be a reference function. The egalitarian solution
with respect to g is the function Eg : Rc ! Rn; given by
EgðS; d; cÞ ¼ gðS; d; cÞ þ k e;
where k ¼ maxfk 2 RjgðS; d; cÞ þ k e 2 Sg; ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc.
Since for all ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc the set S is closed and comprehensive and the set
fx 2 Sjx  dg is bounded, Eg is well deﬁned on Rc. If gðS; d; cÞ 2 S
(gðS; d; cÞ =2 S), then Eg equalizes the gains (losses) from the reference point
(see Fig. 1).
Theorem 3.1. If g : Rc ! Rn satisﬁes E1, E2, E3, then Eg is the unique solution
on Rc which satisﬁes WPO, SYg; TRANS and RMONg:
Proof. Using E1–E3 we can apply a method of proof similar to Kalai’s [7]
characterization of the proportional solution on R and Bossert’s [1] charac-
terization of the claim-egalitarian solution on Rc. It is straightforward to see
that Eg satisﬁes the axioms. Let F : Rc ! Rn be a solution which satisﬁes
WPO, SYg, TRANS, RMONg, and let ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc. By TRANS and E1 we
can assume that gðS; d; cÞ ¼ 0. Then EgðS; d; cÞ ¼ x 2 D. By E2 there exists
S0; d 0; c0ð Þ 2 Rc; S0  S, S0 symmetric, such that S \ D ¼ S0 \ D and
g S0; d 0; c0ð Þ ¼ gðS; d; cÞ. Therefore, x 2 S0 and by RMONg F S0; d 0; c0ð Þ 
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F ðS; d; cÞ. By SYg and WPO we have F S0; d 0; c0ð Þ ¼ x. If x 2 PO ðSÞ this
implies F ðS; d; cÞ ¼ x.
If x 2 WPO ðSÞ n POðSÞ by E3 there exists a sequence
Sn; dn; cnð Þð Þn Rc such that Sn ! S; S  Sn; WPO Snð Þ \ D ¼ PO Snð Þ \ D,
and g Sn; dn; cnð Þ ¼ gðS; d; cÞ for all n. Therefore, Eg Sn; dn; cnð Þ 2 PO Snð Þ \ D
and by the above we conclude that F Sn; dn; cnð Þ ¼ Eg Sn; dn; cnð Þ for all n.
Thus, by RMONg it is true that x ¼ F S0; d 0; c0ð Þ  F ðS; d; cÞ  F Sn; dn; cnð Þ ¼
Eg Sn; dn; cnð Þ for all n. Since g Sn; dn; cnð Þ ¼ gðS; d; cÞ for all n and Sn ! S we
have that Eg Sn; dn; cnð Þ ! x. This implies F ðS; d; cÞ ¼ x ¼ EgðS; d; cÞ. j
A straightforward corollary of Theorem 3.1 is a characterization of
egalitarian-type solutions on the class R. To see this, for any function
h : R ! Rn we denote by h its trivial extension to Rc, namely, h : Rc ! Rn,
deﬁned by hðS; d; cÞ ¼ hðS; dÞ; ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc. Let g : R ! Rn be a reference
function on the class R and let f : D! Rn be a solution on the class D  R.
By WPO, SYg, TRANS
, RMONg, we denote the counterparts of WPO,
SYg, TRANS, RMONg, on the class D. For example,
(SYg) If ðS; dÞ 2 D is such that S is symmetric and gðS; dÞ 2 D, then
f ðS; dÞ 2 D.
For g : R ! Rn deﬁne the solution eg : R ! Rn by
egðS; dÞ ¼ gðS; dÞ þ k e;
where k ¼ maxfk 2 RjgðS; dÞ þ k e 2 Sg; ðS; dÞ 2 R. The following result then
immediately follows from Theorem 3.1, if one notes that, whenever
f : R ! Rn fulﬁlls WPO, SYg, TRANS and RMONg, then f : Rc ! Rn
satisﬁes WPO, SYg, TRANS and RMONg.
Corollary 3.1. If g : R ! Rn is such that g fulﬁlls E1, E2 and E3, then eg is the
unique solution on R that satisﬁes WPO; SYg; TRANS
 and RMONg:
Fig. 1. Egalitarian solution with respect to g and g0. Eg equalizes the gains and Eg
0
equalizes the losses from the reference point
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In the following we present some examples of reference functions
satisfying E1–E3. The ﬁrst 2 examples give rise to well-known bargaining
solutions while the last 3 examples lead to new solutions. Our characteriza-
tion results above show that all solutions obey the same principles, the most
prominent one being a monotonicity axiom, while they diﬀer in the associated
reference function.
For later usage, for any ðS; dÞ 2 R we deﬁne the set of individually rational
points by IR ðS; dÞ ¼ fx 2 Sjx  dg and the utopia point uðS; dÞ by
uiðS; dÞ ¼ maxfxijx 2 IR ðS; dÞg for all i.
Example 3.1. For 0  a  1 let ga : Rc ! Rn be given by
gaðS; d; cÞ ¼ ad þ ð1 aÞc for all ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc:
For a ¼ 0 we ﬁnd that Eg0 is the claim-egalitarian solution proposed by Bossert
[1]. If we deﬁne the reference function g : R ! Rn by gðS; dÞ ¼ d for all
ðS; dÞ 2 R, then g ¼ g1 and eg is the egalitarian solution proposed by Kalai [7].
Example 3.2. Let u : R ! Rn be the reference function that assigns to each
bargaining problem ðS; dÞ the utopia point uðS; dÞ. Then eu is the equal-loss
solution proposed by Chun [2].
Example 3.3. Let m : R ! Rn be given by
miðS; dÞ ¼ minfxijx 2 PO ðSÞ \ IR ðS; dÞg; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n;
for ðS; dÞ 2 R. For two-person games the point of minimal expectations mðS; dÞ
was introduced by Roth [11]. One can argue that for the resolution of the
conﬂict the only relevant agreements are in that part of the Pareto frontier
which dominates the disagreement point. Therefore, miðS; dÞ is the minimum
player i can expect to achieve in the game ðS; dÞ 2 R. Observe that if
ðS; dÞ 2 R is such that WPO ðSÞ \ IRðS; dÞ  POðSÞ, then mðS; dÞ ¼ d. It is
straightforward to see that m satisﬁes E1, while E2 and E3 are satisﬁed only if
n ¼ 2.4
Example 3.4. Let M : Rc ! Rn be given by
MiðS; d; cÞ ¼ minfxijx 2 PO ðSÞ; d  x  cg; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n;
for ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc. The reference point MðS; d; cÞ is a natural extension of m
(see Example 3.3) to the class of bargaining problems with claims. If any
agreement is expected to be individually rational, bounded by the claims
point and such that there are no further gains from cooperation, then
MiðS; d; cÞ is the minimum payoﬀ player i a priori expects to achieve. Observe,
however, that choosing MðS; d; cÞ as a reference point is not suﬃcient for the
4If n ¼ 2 the reference point m uniquely deﬁnes two points on the relative boundary of
the set of Pareto optimal and individually rational points, which is not the case in
general. Therefore, the case n ¼ 2 is qualitatively diﬀerent from the case n > 2. We
already pointed out that originally m was only deﬁned for two-person games (Roth
[11]).
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ﬁnal agreement to be individually rational and bounded by the claims point.
We discuss the issue of boundedness in Remark 3.1. For the same reason as in
Example 3.3 conditions E2 and E3 can only be veriﬁed for n ¼ 2.
Example 3.5. Let t : Rc ! Rn be given
tiðS; d; cÞ ¼ max di;max xij xi; cið Þ 2 Sf gf g; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n;5
for ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc. The adjusted threatpoint tðS; d; cÞ is a minimally equitable
agreement for a bargaining problem with claims, given that no player can
expect someone else to settle with less than what is necessary to satisfy the
claims of the other players, and given that no rational player will accept any
payoﬀ below the disagreement utility level. In the context of bankruptcy
problems Curiel et al. [4] call tiðS; d; cÞ the ‘‘minimal right of claimant i.’’ The
adjusted threatpoint was also used by Herrero [6] to deﬁne the adjusted
proportional rule as we will see in Sect. 5.
Remark 3.1. A major shortcoming of the egalitarian-type solutions is the fact
that, in general, they do not satisfy boundedness, i.e. d  EgðS; d; cÞ  c for
all ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc. However, as it was already shown by Bossert [1] for the
special case of the claim-egalitarian solution, Eg can be modiﬁed in a
straightforward way such as to satisfy boundedness.
To this end let g : Rc ! Rn be a reference function that satisﬁes
d  gðS; d; cÞ  c for all ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rn. If gðS; d; cÞ =2 S, deﬁne the extended
egalitarian solution with respect to g in an iterative way as follows. To simplify
the notation, let g ¼ gðS; d; cÞ. Then let k0 ¼ maxfk 2 Rjgþ k e 2
S and gþ k e  dg. If gþ k0e 2 WPO ðSÞ, deﬁne EgðS; d; cÞ ¼ gþ k0e.
Otherwise, let M1 ¼ fijgi þ k0 > dig and let k1 ¼ maxfk 2 Rjgþ k0eþ
keM1 2 S and gþ k0eþ keM1  dg.6 If gþ k0eþ k1eM1 2 WPO ðSÞ, deﬁne
E
gðS; d; cÞ ¼ gþ k0eþ k1eM1 . Otherwise, repeat the procedure until after
T  n 1 steps gþ k0eþ k1eM1 þ    þ kT eMT 2 WPO ðSÞ, in which case we
deﬁne
E
gðS; d; cÞ ¼ gþ k0eþ k1eM1 þ . . .þ kT eMT :
Then, by deﬁnition d  EgðS; d; cÞ  c. Analogously, we can deﬁne EgðS; d; cÞ
for gðS; d; cÞ 2 S such that EgðS; d; cÞ is bounded by the disagreement and
claims point.
We omit the characterization of the extended egalitarian-type solutions
which requires additional assumptions on the reference function and is
straightforward but more involved than the characterization of the egalitar-
ian-type solutions provided in this section (cf., Theorem 5 in Bossert [1]). ¤
5For x 2 Rn; a 2 R, and i 2 f1; . . . ; ng, the vector a; xið Þ is deﬁned to be the vector
y 2 Rn such that yi ¼ a and yj ¼ xj for all j 6¼ i. Also, by deﬁnition maxð;Þ ¼ 1.
6For T  N let eT 2 Rn be given by eTð Þi¼ 1 if i 2 T , and eTð Þi¼ 0 else.
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4 Nash-type solutions
The result and method of this section are an adaptation of Thomson [12] to
our context of bargaining problems with claims and n players. Analogous to
[12] we impose the following axioms on the reference function g : Rc ! Rn.
(N1) Covariance with respect to positive aﬃne transformations. Let
ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc and let L 2L. Then gðLðS; d; cÞÞ ¼ LðgðS; d; cÞÞ.
(N2) Invariance with respect to symmetrization of almost symmetric problems.
Let ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc with gðS; d; cÞ 2 D and e  x  e  y for all y 2 S where
x 2 WPO ðSÞ \ D. Then there exists S0; d 0; c0ð Þ 2 Rc with S0 symmetric,
S  S0, e  x  e  y for all y 2 S0, and g S0; d 0; c0ð Þ ¼ gðS; d; cÞ.
N1 is a natural assumption for a reference function given that we want rel-
ative utility gains over (or losses from) the reference point to be covariant
under equivalent utility representations. By comparison, N2 is a purely
technical assumption (see our remarks about E2 and E3 in the last section). It
requires that a bargaining problem with claims which already exhibits some
symmetric structure (symmetric reference point and symmetric supporting
hyperplane on the diagonal) can be replaced by a symmetric one without
changing the essential features of the problem.
Let F : Dc ! Rn be a solution on the class Dc  Rc. Together with WPO,
and SYg the following conditions are the original Nash axioms (Nash [9])
with the reference point substituted for the disagreement point (see also
Thomson [12]). Hence they require no further discussion.
(COV) Covariance with respect to positive aﬃne transformations. For all
ðS; d; cÞ 2 Dc and L 2L, if LðS; d; cÞ 2 Dc, then F ðLðS; d; cÞÞ ¼
LðF ðS; d; cÞÞ.
(IAg) Independence of alternatives other than gðS; d; cÞ. If ðS; d; cÞ;
S0; d 0; c0ð Þ 2 Dc with S  S0; gðS; d; cÞ ¼ g S0; d 0; c0ð Þ and F S0; d 0; c0ð Þ 2
S, then F ðS; d; cÞ ¼ F S0; d 0; c0ð Þ.
For any reference function g : Rc ! Rn let
Rcg ¼ fðS; d; cÞ 2 Rcj9 _x 2 S; x gðS; d; cÞg:
Deﬁnition 4.1. Let g : Rc ! Rn be a reference function. The Nash solution with
respect to g is the function Ng : Rcg ! Rn; given by
NgðS; d; cÞ ¼ argmax
Yn
i¼1
xi  giðS; d; cÞð Þ
 x 2 S; x  gðS; d; cÞ
( )
;
ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rcg.
Ng (see Fig. 2) is well deﬁned since fx 2 Sjx  gðS; d; cÞg is bounded for
all ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rcg. The following characterization of Ng is an immediate
adaptation of Thomson’s result [12] to the domain of bargaining problems
with claims. Hence we omit the proof which is analogous to Nash’s own
proof [9].
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Theorem 4.1. If g : Rc ! Rn satisﬁes N1 and N2, then Ng is the unique
solution on Rcg which satisﬁes WPO, SYg, COV and IAg:
Again, a characterization of Nash-type solutions on the class R is obtained
as a straightforward corollary of Theorem 4.1. For g : R ! Rn let
Rg ¼ fðS; dÞ 2 R j 9x 2 S; x gðS; dÞg;
and deﬁne mg : Rg ! Rn by
mgðS; dÞ ¼ argmax
Yn
i¼1
xi  giðS; dÞð Þ
x 2 S; x  gðS; dÞ
( )
;
ðS; dÞ 2 Rg. As before, the counterparts of WPO, SYg, COV, IAg, on a class
D  R are marked with an asterisk .
Corollary 4.1. If g : R ! Rn is such that g fulﬁlls N1 and N2, then mg is the
unique solution on Rg which satisﬁes WPO; SYg; COV
 and IAg:
Again we present some examples of reference functions satisfying N1 and
N2, some of which lead to well-known bargaining solutions.
Example 4.1. Consider the reference functions m : R ! Rn and M : Rc ! Rn,
deﬁned in Examples 3.3 and 3.4, which assign to each bargaining problem the
point of minimal expectations in the respective context. The solution mm was
ﬁrst studied by Roth [11]. In contrast to E2 and E3, N2 is satisﬁed by m andM
for all n.
Example 4.2. For 0  a  1 let ga : Rc ! Rn be the reference function deﬁned
in Example 3.1. As a special case we get g1ðS; d; cÞ ¼ d for all ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc. If
we deﬁne the reference function g : R ! Rn by gðS; dÞ ¼ d for all ðS; dÞ 2 R,
then g ¼ g1 and mg is the Nash solution (Nash [9]).
Example 4.3. The adjusted threatpoint t : Rc ! Rn deﬁned in Example 3.5
satisﬁes N1 and N2 and gives rise to the bargaining solutionNt that has not
been studied so far.
Fig. 2. Nash solution with respect to g
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Remark 4.1. The solutionNg shares a shortcoming with the egalitarian-type
solutions discussed before, namely that it may assign a utility allocation
which is not bounded by the claims point. Hence, we propose a modiﬁcation
of the Nash solution with respect to g which is bounded by the claims point.
For any reference function g : Rc ! Rn and ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc let BDgðS; d; cÞ ¼
fx 2 SjgðS; d; cÞ  x  cg and Rcg ¼ fðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc j 9x 2 BDgðS; d; cÞ; x
gðS; d; cÞg. Then, the bounded Nash solution with respect to g is the function
N
g
: Rcg ! Rn, given by
N
gðS; d; cÞ ¼ argmax
Yn
i¼1
xi  giðS; d; cÞð Þ
x 2 BDgðS; d; cÞ
( )
;
ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rcg. A characterization of the bounded Nash solution is easily
obtained under a slight modiﬁcation of the axioms N2, SYg and IAg.
7
If, in addition, the reference function satisﬁes individual rationality, i.e.
gðS; d; cÞ  d for all ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rcg, then N
g
is individually rational as
well. ¤
5 Proportional-type solutions
In order to characterize proportional-type solutions we consider a diﬀerent
kind of reference function: Let g : Rc ! Rn  Rnþ, where gðS; d; cÞ ¼
grðS; d; cÞ; gpðS; d; cÞð Þ and kgpðS; d; cÞk ¼ 1 for all ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc.8 Thus, the
reference function g assigns to any bargaining problem with claims not only a
reference point grðS; d; cÞ but also a vector of weights gpðS; d; cÞ. These
weights can be interpreted as relative ‘‘bargaining strengths’’ of the players
which are deduced from the bargaining game ðS; d; cÞ.9 We will see later that
several well-known bargaining solutions are deﬁned with respect to this type
of reference function.
We impose the following assumptions on g : Rc ! Rn  Rnþ.
(P1) Covariance with respect to positive aﬃne transformations. Let
ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc and let L 2L be given by LiðxÞ ¼ aixi þ bi for all i and all
x 2 Rn, where a 2 Rnþþ and b 2 Rn. Then
7N2 is modiﬁed as follows: Let ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc with gðS; d; cÞ 2 D and let
x 2 BDgðS; d; cÞ \ D satisfy e  x  e  y for all y 2 BDgðS; d; cÞ: Then there exists
S0; d 0; c0ð Þ 2 Rc with S0 symmetric, such that BDgðS; d; cÞ  BDg S0; d 0; c0ð Þ; e  x  e  y
for all y 2 BDg S0; d 0; c0ð Þ; and g S0; d 0; c0ð Þ ¼ gðS; d; cÞ: In SYg add the requirement that
x  c for x 2 WPO ðSÞ \ D, and in IAg change the requirements that S  S0 and
F S0; d 0; c0ð Þ 2 S to BDgðS; d; cÞ  BDg S0; d 0; c0ð Þ and F S0; d 0; c0ð Þ 2 BDgðS; d; cÞ,
respectively.
8k  k denotes the euclidean norm in Rn.
9The type of reference function we consider here is in fact equivalent to a function
which assigns to each bargaining problem with claims two reference points (a good
example would be the status quo and the claims point). However, for technical reasons
it is more convenient to work with the type of reference function deﬁned before.
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grðLðS; d; cÞÞ ¼ L grðS; d; cÞð Þ and gpðLðS; d; cÞÞ ¼ kLa gpðS; d; cÞð Þ;
where La 2L is given by Lai ðxÞ ¼ aixi for all i and x 2 Rn, and
k ¼ kLa gpðS; d; cÞð Þk1.
(P2) Invariance with respect to the restriction to a symmetric subset. Let
ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc be such that gðS; d; cÞ 2 D D. Then there exists
S0; d 0; c0ð Þ 2 Rc such that S0  S, S0 is symmetric, S0 \ D ¼ S \ D, and
g S0; d 0; c0ð Þ ¼ gðS; d; cÞ.
(P3) Invariance with respect to approximation. Let ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc be such that
gðS; d; cÞ 2 D D. Then there exists a sequence Sn; dn; cnð Þð Þn Rc such
that Sn ! S; S  Sn;WPO Snð Þ \ D ¼ PO Snð Þ \ D; and g Sn; dn; cnð Þ ¼
gðS; d; cÞ for all n.
P2 and P3 are the exact counterparts of E2 and E3 for the type of reference
function we consider in this section. Similarly, P1 is the analogue of N1.
Observe that the covariance condition we impose upon gpðÞ is very natural:
the origin of utility measurement should not inﬂuence a player’s relative
bargaining strength, while if we scale up or down a player’s utility by a given
factor, then his relative bargaining strength should be scaled up or down
accordingly.
Let F : Dc ! Rn be a solution on the class Dc  Rc. By SY2g and
RMON2g we denote the analogue of SYg and RMONg for the type of ref-
erence function we are considering here (in SYg simply replace the condition
gðS; d; cÞ 2 D by gðS; d; cÞ 2 D D). For any reference function
g : Rc ! Rn  Rnþ let
R
c
g ¼ ðS; d; cÞ 2 RcjgpðS; d; cÞ 2 Rnþþ
 
:
Deﬁnition 5.1. Let g : Rc ! Rn  Rnþ be a reference function. The proportional
solution with respect to g is the function Pg : R
c
g ! Rn, given by
PgðS; d; cÞ ¼ grðS; d; cÞ þ kgpðS; d; cÞ;
where k ¼ max k 2 RjgrðS; d; cÞ þ kgpðS; d; cÞ 2 Sf g; ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rcg.
Observe that the term ‘‘proportional’’ does not mean that relative utility
gains are exogenously given. Rather, the vector of weights arises endoge-
nously from the bargaining problem. In particular, the egalitarian-type
solutions analyzed in Sect. 3 do not belong to the class of proportional-type
solutions deﬁned here. Given the assumptions on the class R
c
g it is straight-
forward to see that Pg (see Fig. 3) is well deﬁned.
We omit the proof of the following theorem which is similar to the proof
of Theorem 3.1 if one observes that ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rcg for any ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc with
gpðS; d; cÞ 2 D.
Theorem 5.1. Let g : Rc ! Rn  Rnþ with gðS; d; cÞ ¼ grðS; d; cÞ; gpðS; d; cÞð Þ
and kgpðS; d; cÞk ¼ 1 for all ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc; satisfy P1, P2, P3. Then Pg is the
unique solution on R
c
g which satisﬁes WPO, SY2g; COV and RMON2g:
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As a corollary we again obtain a characterization of proportional-type
solutions on the class R : Let g : R ! Rn  Rnþ be such that gðS; dÞ ¼ grðS; dÞ;ð
gpðS; dÞÞ with kgpðS; dÞk ¼ 1 for all ðS; dÞ 2 R. As before, we denote by
WPO, SY2g, COV
 and RMON2g the counterparts of WPO, SY2g, COV
and RMON2g for a reference function g : R ! Rn  Rnþ, and a solution
f : D! Rn deﬁned on a subclass D  R. Let Rg ¼ ðS; dÞ 2f RjgpðS; dÞ 2
Rnþþg. For g : R ! Rn  Rnþ we deﬁne the solution qg : Rg ! Rn by
qgðS; dÞ ¼ grðS; dÞ þ kgpðS; dÞ;
where k ¼ max k 2 RjgrðS; dÞ þ kgpðS; dÞ 2 Sf g; ðS; dÞ 2 R.
Corollary 5.1. Let g : R ! Rn  Rnþ with gðS; dÞ ¼ grðS; dÞ; gpðS; dÞð Þ and
kgpðS; dÞk ¼ 1 for all ðS; dÞ 2 Rg; be such that g fulﬁlls P1, P2 and P3. Then qg
is the unique solution on Rg that satisﬁes WPO; SY2g; COV
 and RMON2g:
In the following we present some examples of reference functions which
satisfy P1–P3 and which give rise to well-known bargaining solutions. Again
our results show that all these solutions obey the same principles and only
diﬀer in the associated reference function.
Example 5.1. Let g : Rc ! Rn  Rnþ be given by
grðS; d; cÞ ¼ d; gpðS; d; cÞ ¼ ðc dÞkc dk1; ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc:
Observe that g is well deﬁned since c > d for all ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc. For this choice
of g the solution Pg is the proportional solution proposed by Chun and
Thomson [3].
Example 5.2. Let g : R ! Rn  Rnþ be given by
grðS; dÞ ¼ d and gpðS; dÞ ¼
kðuðS; dÞ  dÞ; if uðS; dÞ > dﬃﬃ
1
n
q
e; else
(
;
Fig. 3. Proportional solution with respect to g
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where k ¼ kuðS; dÞ  dk1; ðS; dÞ 2 R. For this choice of g the solution qg is
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution which was proposed by Raiﬀa [10] and was
later axiomatically characterized by Kalai and Smorodinsky [8].
Example 5.3. Let g : Rc ! Rn  Rnþ be given by
grðS; d; cÞ ¼ tðS; d; cÞ; gpðS; d; cÞ ¼ kðc tðS; d; cÞÞ;
where k ¼ kc tðS; d; cÞk1; ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc. (For a deﬁnition of tðS; d; cÞ see
Example 3.5.) Since tðS; d; cÞ 2 S and c =2 S the function g is well deﬁned.
Then, the solution Pg is the adjusted proportional solution proposed by
Herrero [6].
Example 5.4. Let g : Rc ! Rn  Rnþ be given by
grðS; d; cÞ ¼ tðS; d; cÞ;
gpðS; d; cÞ ¼
kðuðS; tðS; d; cÞÞ  tðS; d; cÞÞ; if uðS; tðS; d; cÞÞ > tðS; d; cÞ
ﬃﬃ
1
n
q
e; else
(
;
where k ¼ kuðS; tðS; d; cÞÞ  tðS; d; cÞk1; ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rc. For this choice of g
the solution Pg is the extended Kalai–Smorodinsky solution Kt proposed by
Gerber [5].
Remark 5.1. Again, for a general reference function g satisfying P1–P3 the
proportional solution with respect to g may violate individual rationality or
boundedness by the claims point. However, similar to the case of egalitarian-
type solutions (see Remark 3.1) it is straightforward to deﬁne and charac-
terize extended proportional-type solutions which satisfy boundedness.10 ¤
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a unifying approach to the solution of bargaining prob-
lems with and without claims by using the concept of a reference function.
This function was taken to be exogenously given, reﬂecting that in many real
world situations there exist ‘‘focal points’’ as perceived by an arbitrator, by a
group of players or by society as a whole. Although a reference function
sometimes may be naturally given, from a theoretical point of view, we might
be interested in the choice of the reference function. A reference function g
can be characterized either directly or indirectly, i.e., either by imposing a set
of axioms on g itself or on the solution which is deﬁned with respect to g. It
seems safe to conjecture that it is not possible to uniquely characterize a given
reference function.11 Rather, we can hope to characterize a certain range in
10In Remark 3.1 simply replace e by gpðS; d; cÞ for ðS; d; cÞ 2 Rcg.
11At least not without using an axiom that has the ﬂavor of prescribing which
reference function to choose.
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which the reference points will lie. The main reason for this indeterminacy is
that a reference function, in general, does not assign a weakly Pareto optimal
outcome to a bargaining problem. Often the reference point is not even a
feasible utility allocation. A diﬀerent question is whether for a given bar-
gaining solution there is a ‘‘natural’’ reference function that can be associated
with the solution. These questions are left for future research.
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